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Sobre a COP de Paris

Sobre a COP de Paris, entendo que a avaliação de avanço ou não depende da compreensão do contexto da política internacional do clima. Destaco dois pontos, que considero essenciais.

1. Descarbonização

Há consenso científico sobre a necessidade de diminuir a emissão de combustíveis fósseis (petróleo, carvão, xisto…e desmatamento). Outros caminhos, como as energias renováveis, o mercado de carbono, a geoengenharia, o reflorestamento, são paliativos/engodo, se não reduzirmos as emissões dos fósseis. Não há, no acordo de Paris, menção a redução de combustíveis fósseis, resultado do eficiente lobby dos setores interessados, dos países produtores e consumidores, muito bem representados pelos países da OPEP.

Então, em 2015, ainda não conseguimos transformar em consenso político internacional o consenso científico da necessidade de reduzir a queima de combustíveis fósseis. Em síntese, precisaríamos de um conjunto de medidas que obrigassem o desinvestimento em fósseis e o investimento em renováveis. Não complementaridade, ou suplementaridade, como temos hoje, mas redirecionamento de subsídios, tributação pela emissão de fósseis, etc.

2. Diferenciação entre países desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento.

Esse é, desde o início, um “calo”. Em 1997 (quando da assinatura do Protocolo de Quioto), costurou-se um consenso: a UE negociou no sentido de que países em desenvolvimento não tivessem redução de emissão, e esses toparam assinar o tratado. Os EUA não toparam o acordo (assinaram mas não ratificaram). E isso implodiu os resultados de redução de emissão, que foram pífios, como esperado. Desde então, vem se tentando construir alguma coisa que supere essa trava, que mantenha a diferenciação, mas que tire China, Índia e Brasil, por exemplo, da postura confortável de contrariedade de adoção de metas de redução (com um discurso insustentável de direito de se desenvolver poluindo como os outros poluíram). A forma de trazer todos para a mesa e garantir um acordo foi permitir que cada país diga como, quanto e quando quer reduzir as emissões (INDCs – Intended Nationally Determined Contributions). Deu certo, entregaram suas metas. Mas a soma do comprometimento dos países não nos leva a qualquer lugar próximo do “seguro” do ponto de vista climático. Não há forma de verificação clara e transparente estabelecida para avaliar cumprimento das INDCs, e não há sanção estabelecida pelo não cumprimento. Resta a possibilidade de mobilização popular.

É a 21ª reunião. São 21 anos. O primeiro tratado do clima, a Convenção-Quadro, foi assinado em 1992, e já reconhecia o problema. Há inegável avanço do ponto de vista do reconhecimento do problema, da compreensão dos seus efeitos. A popularização do tema está ligada à sua apropriação por grupos sociais distintos, que propõem diferentes respostas para lidar com ele (dos anticapitalistas e ecossocialistas aos defensores da economia de baixo carbono e da economia verde). A influência dos “céticos” ou “negacionistas” diminuiu. Portanto, avançamos, nesses vinte anos, no reconhecimento político do problema (quantificado em quantos graus devemos manter o aumento da temperatura!), mas não há evidências concretas de rompimento com modelo de desenvolvimento centrado nos fósseis.

Por fim, o acordo de Paris traz menções a um mecanismo que viria para substituir os mecanismos de flexibilização de Quioto. O novo mecanismo (internationally transferred mitigation outcomes), que depende ainda de regulamentação, permitirá que países invistam em projetos de redução de emissão em outros países, e recebam os créditos de carbono que deixaram de ser emitidos. Trata-se da mesma fórmula que vem sendo implementada sem sucesso desde 1997, porém ampliada, permitindo o reconhecimento de projetos controversos, como os que envolvem florestas.

Embora o acordo de Paris apresente-se, hoje, como um documento importante para sinalizar o consenso em relação ao problema, não indica, de longe, o caminho necessário para combater as mudanças climáticas, que envolve a adoção de normas que constranjam a emissão de fósseis

19 August, 2015 17:00

The Woman Who Could Stop Climate Change – The New Yorker.pdf

19 August, 2015 16:54

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/24/the-weight-of-the-world

Determinada indenização por pulverização de agrotóxicos em propriedade vizinha

Blog do Centro de Estudos Ambientais

Link to Centro de Estudos Ambientais

Scientific American – The new environmentalism will lead us to disaster

The New Environmentalism Will Lead Us to Disaster

So-called ecopragmatists say we can have a “good Anthropocene.” They’re dead wrong
Jun 19, 2014 |By Clive Hamilton

environmental pragmatism

The argument absolves us all of the need to change our ways, which is music to the ears of political conservatives.
Credit: Doc Searls via Flickr

SA Forum is an invited essay from experts on topical issues in science and technology.

Fourteen years ago, when a frustrated Paul Crutzen blurted out the word “Anthropocene” at a scientific meeting in Mexico, the famous atmospheric chemist was expressing his despair at the scale of human damage to Earth. So profound has been the influence of humans, Nobelist Crutzen and his colleagues later wrote, that the planet has entered a new geologic epoch defined by a single, troubling fact: The “human imprint on the global environment has now become so large and active that it rivals some of the great forces of nature in its impact on the functioning of the Earth system.”

The science behind Crutzen’s claim is extensive and robust, and it centers on the profound and irreversible changes brought by global warming. Yet almost as soon as the idea of the Anthropocene took hold, people began revising its meaning and distorting its implications. A new breed of ecopragmatists welcomed the epoch as an opportunity. They have gathered around the Breakthrough Institute, a “neogreen” think tank founded by Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, the authors of a controversial 2004 paper, “The Death of Environmentalism.” They do not deny global warming; instead they skate over the top of it, insisting that whatever limits and tipping points the Earth system might throw up, human technology and ingenuity will transcend them.

As carbon dioxide concentrations pass 400 ppm for the first time in a million years, and scientists warn of a U.S. baking in furnacelike summers by the 2070s, Shellenberger and Nordhaus wrote that by the end of the century “nearly all of us will be prosperous enough to live healthy, free and creative lives.” The answer, they say, is not to change course but to more tightly “embrace human power, technology and the larger process of modernization.”

The argument absolves us all of the need to change our ways, which is music to the ears of political conservatives. The Anthropocene is system-compatible.

This technoutopian vision depends on a belief that, with the advent of the new geologic epoch, nothing essential has changed. This reimagined Anthropocene rests on a seamless transition from the fact that humans have always modified their environments to a defense of a postmodern “cyber nature” under human supervision, as if there is no qualitative difference between fire-stick farming and spraying sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere to regulate Earth’s temperature.

For this reason, respected palaeoclimatologist William Ruddiman’s hypothesis that the Anthropocene began some 8,000 years ago with the onset of farming and forest clearing has immediate appeal to ecopragmatists. It seems to give scientific grounding to the desire to defend the status quo against the evidence that the culprit is technoindustrialism’s aggressive fossil fuel–driven expansionism, which began at the end of the 18th century.

The early-Anthropocene hypothesis effectively dissolves the distinction between the Holocene, which started some 11,700 years ago and encompasses the beginning of agriculture, and the Anthropocene, enabling ecopragmatists to argue that there is nothing inherently preferable about a Holocene Earth—a moral claim that permits the conscious creation of a different kind of planet. Hence, their attraction to geoengineering schemes aimed at regulating solar radiation or changing the chemical composition of the oceans. In the words of the most vocal ecopragmatist, the environmental scientist Erle Ellis, “We will be proud of the planet we create.” Ellis speaks of “the good Anthropocene,” a golden era in which we relinquish nostalgic attachments to a nature untouched by humans and embrace the new epoch as “ripe with human-directed opportunity.”

But the idea of a good Anthropocene is based on a fundamental misreading of science. It arises from a failure to make the cognitive leap from ecological thinking—the science of the relationship between organisms and their local environments—to Earth system thinking, the science of the whole Earth as a complex system beyond the sum of its parts. The early Anthropocene hypothesis goes against strong evidence, provided by Crutzen, Will Steffen and other researchers, that only with the beginning of the industrial revolution can we detect a human influence on the functioning of the Earth system as a whole.

The revolutionary meaning of Earth-system science is lost on the ecopragmatists. In reality, the arrival of the new epoch represents not merely the further spread of human influence across the globe but a fundamental shift in the relationship between humans and the Earth system—one in which human activity now accelerates, decelerates and distorts the great cycles that make the planet a dynamic entity. The radical distinctiveness of the Anthropocene lies in the fact that humans have become a novel “force of nature,” one that is shaping the geologic evolution of the planet. So far-reaching is the impact of modern humans that esteemed palaeoclimatologist Wally Broecker has suggested that we have not entered a new geologic epoch, a relatively minor event on the geologic time scale, but a new era—the Anthropozoic—on a par in Earth history with the development of multicellular life.

Some climate science deniers believe only God can change the climate; ecopragmatists, by contrast, see humans as “the god species.” Here is what the god species and this kind of thinking are certain to give us: an atmosphere with 500 ppm of CO2 (probably closer to 700 ppm) and a climate that is hot, sticky and chaotic. It will indeed take omnipotence to fix the problem without calamity. For those who prefer orthodox climate science, such unbounded optimism is dangerous, wishful thinking.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)

Clive Hamilton is professor of public ethics at Charles Sturt University in Canberra. He is the author of Earthmasters: The Dawn of the Age of Climate Engineering (Yale University Press, 2013).

França, Alemanha e Reino Unido recuam no tema da aviação

RPT-UK, France, Germany attack EU aircraft carbon plan

Fri Dec 6, 2013 4:50am EST

* EU officials to debate the issue on Friday

* Denmark concerned about environment, legal tangles

* Britain says EU Commission misread international mood

By Barbara Lewis

BRUSSELS, Dec 5 (Reuters) – Leading European Union states Britain, France andGermany propose scrapping a plan to make all aircraft pay a carbon charge for using EU airspace, documents seen by Reuters show.

The combined weight of the three powers means there is a strong chance they will get their way, pleasing trading partners such as China.

In a joint document, Britain, France and Germany say they are concerned about “the political acceptability and practical implementation of an airspace-Emissions Trading Scheme”.

EU diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, said many of the 28 member states agreed the European Commission’s proposal on charging flights using EU airports for their emissions in EU airspace was impractical, but not all.

Denmark, for instance, has drawn up its own position paper, saying the aviation sector must take responsibility for its share of greenhouse gas emissions.

EU officials will hold a meeting on the issue on Friday.

An EU law on charging aviation for emissions has caused a heated debate and threats of an international trade war.

Eventually the Commission agreed to suspend it for intercontinental flights, but on condition a global alternative was drawn up. The law has remained for intra-EU flights.

The U.N.’s International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in October agreed it would deliver a global plan to curb airline emissions by 2016 for implementation in 2020.

The Commission’s response was to propose just charging aircraft for emissions in EU airspace, rather than for the entire flight.

But Britain, France and Germany’s proposal calls instead for no charges before 2016 when the ICAO will hold another general assembly.

Environmentalists and some members of the European Parliament have condemned the ICAO deal as far too weak and accuse the big powers of being beholden to China.

They note that Britain, France and Germany all have an interest in Airbus, which has played a major lobbying role.

China, which objected to the extraterritorial nature of the EU law, froze Airbus jet orders in protest and some of those purchases are still on ice.

“This is an extraordinary move by the big three repudiating a Commission proposal and pre-empting parliamentary debate even while the ink is barely dry,” Aoife O’Leary, a policy officer at T&E campaign group, said.

“Regulating aviation emissions in Europe’s own airspace is an environmentally effective fix to the aviation ETS after the ICAO resolution.”

‘GLOBAL REALITIES’

Britain says it is just being realistic.

Niall Mackenzie, a senior official at Britain’s Department of Energy and Climate Change, said in London on Thursday the Commission had misread the international mood and was not reflecting “global realities”.

The Danish paper, seen by Reuters, warns of possible legal complications of scrapping the Commission plan.

Possible legal issues, to which the Commission has also pointed, include a lawsuit from low-cost airlines, which say they are at a disadvantage.

These airlines operate almost exclusively within the EU and have never been exempt from the carbon charge.

The Commission is also concerned about opposition from the parliament, whose consent is needed to legalise any amendment.

 

Without its approval, the original law, covering the length of intercontinental flights into EU airports, would reapply, raising the possibility of a new outbreak of trade threats.

Inclusão da aviação internacional no mercado de carbono europeu volta a ganhar força

Mercado de Carbono /
Notícias

Inclusão da aviação internacional no mercado de carbono europeu volta a ganhar força
31/01/2014 – Autor: Jéssica Lipinski – Fonte: Instituto CarbonoBrasil

O Comitê Ambiental do Parlamento Europeu (MEPs) votou nesta quinta-feira (30) a favor da aplicação do Esquema de Comércio de Emissões da União Europeia (EU ETS) para todas as companhias aéreas que operem no espaço aéreo do bloco, embora a França, o Reino Unido e outros países queiram que o esquema se restrinja apenas a voos internos.

A votação é apenas mais um capítulo de um longa história, que já se arrasta há alguns anos. Em 2012, a União Europeia decidiu cobrar de todas as companhias aéreas que chegassem e partissem da UE, internacionais ou não, pelas emissões de voos para ou da Europa.

Depois de muito debate e de retaliações por parte de países como a China, que chegou inclusive a suspender a compra de aeronaves de empresas da UE, os europeus decidiram limitar as emissões apenas de companhias que realizassem voos internos na Europa, exigindo, contudo, que a Organização da Aviação Civil Internacional (OACI) desenvolvesse uma forma de reduzir as emissões da aviação em todo o mundo.

Em outubro do ano passado, cerca de 190 nações concordaram, em um encontro da OACI, em firmar um acordo global até 2016 para diminuir as emissões do setor aéreo a partir de 2020. O resultado foi mais fraco do que a UE esperava.

Por um lado, a maioria das companhias aéreas internacionais se opõe à ideia original da UE de cobrar pelas emissões de seus voos inteiros. Por outro , as que fazem os voos internos, em sua maioria empresas pequenas e com uma margem de lucro menor, afirmam que a UE não deveria ter suspendido a lei original, e deveria cobrar de todas as linhas aéreas.

A Comissão Europeia deve buscar um acordo até o final de abril, caso contrário a legislação anterior será reaplicada automaticamente.

Backloading

Também nesta quinta-feira, o Comitê Ambiental votou a favor de que a retirada dos 900 milhões de permissões do EU ETS, medida chamada de backloading e que tem como objetivo reduzir o excesso de créditos no mercado, comece já nos próximos meses, embora a data ainda não tenha sido fixada.

Se a retenção ocorrer no primeiro trimestre, 400 milhões de créditos serão suspensos neste ano, 300 milhões em 2015 e 200 milhões em 2016. Caso ocorra depois de março, serão retiradas 350 milhões de permissões neste ano, 350 milhões no próximo e 250 milhões em 2016.

O Comitê de Indústria e Energia quer rejeitar a proposta inteiramente, mas se em três meses o parlamento e o Conselho da UE, que representam todos os 28 governos do bloco, não tiverem mais objeções, o Comitê Ambiental pode transformar a proposta em lei.

US fracking revolution dilutes EU climate & energy plan

US fracking revolution dilutes EU climate & energy plan

http://www.climatenewsnetwork.net/2014/01/us-fracking-revolution-dilutes-eu-climate-energy-plan/

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

By Kieran Cooke

Tackling climate change comes off second best in the European Union’s latest package of climate and energy targets. Instead, maintaining economic competitiveness – particularly with the US – is the priority.

LONDON, 23 January – On the face of it, this week’s EU climate and energy package, with its targets for cutbacks in emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) and the uptake of renewable energy up to the year 2030, looks impressive.

The central element in the package is a binding EU-wide 40% reduction in GHG emissions over 1990 levels by 2030. Significantly, this has to be achieved “through domestic measures alone” – meaning member states can’t meet emissions reductions obligations by making offsetting GHG cutbacks in other countries.

There’s also a binding target of achieving at least a 27% share of the European energy mix from renewables by the same year and plans for a major overhaul of the EU’s ill-performing Emissions Trading System (ETS), with the aim of lifting the market price for carbon and encouraging emission reductions across the industrial sector.

“If all other regions were equally ambitious about tackling climate change, the world would be in significantly better shape”, says Connie Hedegaard, the EU Climate Commissioner.

Yet while the figures might impress, it’s clear the fracking revolution in the US has the EU’s energy strategists on the run. According to the European Commission, US gas prices fell by 66% between 2005 and 2012 while in Europe they rose by 35% over the same period.

‘No contradiction’

Reflecting intense lobbying by Europe’s industrialists and several governments, the EU package repeatedly emphasises the need to retain economic competitiveness.

“Climate action is central for the future of our planet, while a truly European energy policy is key to our competitiveness” says Jose Manuel Barroso, the EC President.

Barroso insists that tackling the two issues simultaneously is not contradictory, but the EU’s critics say the latest package is designed more to satisfy short-term economic aims than to seriously tackle climate change.

The long-term goal of EU climate and energy policy is to reduce GHG emissions by up to 95% by 2050, limiting the rise in global average temperature to 2°C over pre-industrial levels and so hopefully averting runaway climate change.

Climate scientists and green groups within the EU say the 2030 targets are not nearly ambitious enough and make the 2050 goal very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

"We ask questions as if the science is in any real doubt. It is not."

“We have to take into account that the 40% target is the death knell of 2°C and probably much more aligned with 4°C once all the trading/CDM/offsetting scams are factored in”, says Kevin Anderson, professor of energy and climate change at the University of Manchester in the UK and deputy director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research.

“As a climate community, we continually forget that not acting now has repercussions that in themselves change what the future will be – we ask questions as if the science is in any real doubt. It is not.”

The EU’s target for renewables has also come under fire, with critics saying the Commission has once again given in to powerful EU fossil fuel, nuclear and shale gas lobby groups.

Goal optional

Earlier proposals by a number of countries, including Germany, called for a 2030 renewables target of at least 30%.

At the insistence of countries such as Britain, which has both announced plans for a large-scale expansion of nuclear energy and is giving incentives to encourage the fracking industry, and Poland, which is heavily reliant on coal for its power and is also intent on exploiting shale gas, the target was lowered.

Furthermore the 27% goal for renewables is binding only on an EU-wide basis and not on individual member states: the result is likely to be that some countries will choose to reduce or opt out of meeting the target figure, leaving others to make up the shortfall by dramatically upping renewables use. In such circumstances, arguments could quickly develop.

By contrast, the present EU renewables target – a 20% share in the energy mix by 2020 – is binding on individual states.

Door open for shale

Ultimately, it is the need for Europe to maintain its economic competitiveness that is dominating EU strategy. That has meant scaling back on emissions cutbacks and renewable ambitions – and opening the door to the shale gas industry.

EC President Barroso says shale gas is changing the energy landscape in a dramatic way. Many in Europe are fiercely opposed to shale gas, yet the EU has stood back from imposing any EU-wide regulations on the industry, only issuing guidelines in its new package covering health and safety issues.

“It’s a good demonstration of the role the EU should play, setting the cross-border rules for environmental health and safety but not meddling in the energy mix that is chosen by member states”, says Barroso.

The package of EU proposals will now move on to be discussed by Europe’s leaders in March. – Climate News Network

Krugman: a Civilização no cassino

Krugman: a Civilização no cassino

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131109-Aquecimento

Interesses econômicos, ideologia do livre-mercado e crença infinita na técnica bloqueiam ação contra mudança climática. É uma aposta mortal

Por Paul Krugman, no New York Review of Books | Tradução: Cristiana Martin


Resenha de:
The Climate Casino: Risk, Uncertainty, and Economics for a Warming World“, de William D. Nordhaus, Yale University Press, 378 pp.

1.

Quarenta anos atrás, um jovem e brilhante economista da Universidade de Yale chamado William Nordhaus publicou um renomado artigo, The Allocation of Energy Resources, que expandiu fronteiras na análise econômica. Nordhaus argumentou que era necessário pensar claramente sobre a economia de recursos esgotáveis como petróleo e carvão, para olhar para o futuro e avaliar seu valor à medida que vão ficando mais escassos. Esse olhar necessariamente envolveria considerar, não apenas recursos disponíveis e crescimento econômico futuro, mas também prováveis futuras tecnologias. Além disso, Nordhaus desenvolveu um método incorporando todas essas informações – estimativa de recursos, previsões econômicas de longo prazo e as melhores previsões de engenheiros sobre custos de futuras tecnologias – em um modelo quantitativo de preços energéticos em um longo período.

Os recursos e informações de engenheiros para o artigo de Nordhaus foram, na maioria, organizados e reunidos por seu assistente, um aluno de graduação de 20 anos que permaneceu longas horas fechado na Biblioteca de Geologia de Yale, debruçado no “Bureau of Mines” e afins. Era uma aprendizagem de valor inestimável. Minhas razões para ter buscado este trecho de história intelectual, no entanto, vão muito além da revelação pessoal – embora os leitores desta resenha devam saber que Bill Nordhaus foi meu primeiro mentor profissional. Pois se alguém se debruçar sobre The Allocation of Energy Resources, aprenderá duas lições cruciais. Primeiro, que é difícil fazer previsões, especialmente sobre o futuro distante. Segundo, que às vezes as previsões devem ser feitas mesmo assim.

Voltando a “Allocation” depois de quatro décadas, o que salta aos olhos é o quão errado estavam os especialistas a respeito das futuras tecnologias. Por anos, seus erros pareciam estar em um superotimismo, especialmente sobre a produção de petróleo e de energia nuclear. Mais recentemente, as surpresas apresentaram-se do lado oposto. A extração de petróleo por meio de fracking tem maior impacto imediato nos mercados, mas a novidade fundamental é a competitividade crescente das energias solar e eólica – nenhuma das quais apareceu na obra “Allocation”. Os preços atuais do petróleo, ajustados pela inflação, são praticamente o dobro do que Nordhaus havia previsto, enquanto o preço do carvão e especialmente o do gás natural estão bem abaixo de suas bases de cálculo.

topo-posts-margem

De modo que o futuro é incerto, uma realidade reconhecida no título do novo livro de Nordhaus: The Climate Casino: RiskUncertainty, e Economics for a Warming World (“O Cassino Climático: Risco, Incerteza e Economia para um Mundo em Aquecimento”, sem edição em português). Ainda assim, as decisões devem ser feitas levando em consideração o futuro – e às vezes o futuro de longo prazo. Isso é verdade quando se trata de recursos esgotáveis, em que cada barril de petróleo queimado hoje é um barril não disponível para as próximas gerações. É ainda mais verdadeiro para o aquecimento global, em que cada tonelada de dióxido de carbono emitida hoje permanecerá na atmosfera, alterando o clima do planeta, para as gerações vindouras. E, como enfatiza Nordhaus – talvez não tanto quanto alguns gostariam –, quando falamos em mudanças climáticas a incerteza leva ao aumento, e não ao enfraquecimento da necessidade de ação imediata.

No entanto, embora a incerteza não possa ser banida da questão do aquecimento global, podemos e devemos fazer as melhores previsões possíveis. Acompanhando seu estudo sobre as energias futuras, Nordhaus tornou-se pioneiro no desenvolvimento de “modelos de avaliação integrada”, que tentam reunir o que conhecemos sobre dois sistemas – a economia e o clima –, mapeando a interação entre eles na tentativa de analisar a relação custo-benefício de políticas alternativas (2). Por um lado, The Climate Casino é um esforço para popularizar os resultados dos IAMs e de suas implicações. Mas é também, claro, um convite à ação. Vou perguntar adiante, nesta resenha, se esse convite tem alguma chance de sucesso.

2.

Estilisticamente, The Climate Casino deve ser lido mais como cartilha do que como manifesto – algo que certamente frustrará muitos ativistas climáticos.

Trata-se, é bom lembrar, de uma posição característica de Nordhaus: na comunidade de pessoas razoáveis, que aceitam a realidade do aquecimento global e a necessidade de fazer algo a respeito, ele tem assumido o papel de desmistificador, criticando afirmações muito fortes, que não acredita serem justificáveis por teorias ou evidências. Ele levantou bandeiras de relativo otimismo sobre nossa capacidade de adaptação ao aquecimento global moderado. Criticou duramente o estudo de Nicholas Stern, amplamente divulgado, sobre a economia das mudanças climáticas, argumentando que não deveríamos pensar nos custos impostos às futuras gerações devido ao consumo de combustíveis fósseis nas gerações atuais (3). E assumiu uma postura cética em relação aos argumentos de Martin Weitzman, de Harvard, de ampla circulação, de que o risco de efeitos climáticos catastróficos justifica ações muito rápidas e agressivas para limitar emissões de gases do efeito estufa (4).

Como eu dizia, a participação de Nordhaus nessas controvérsias frustrou alguns ativistas do clima, até porque adversários de todo e qualquer tipo de ação contra as mudanças climáticas usaram seus trabalhos para apoiar a posição deles. Dito isto, é importante notar que The Climate Casino não é, de modo algum, o trabalho de alguém cético sobre a realidade do aquecimento global e a necessidade de agir imediatamente. Ele meio que ridiculariza afirmativas de que as mudanças climáticas não estão acontecendo ou não são resultado da atividade humana. E conclama à ação agressiva: sua melhor estimativa sobre o que deveríamos estar fazendo envolve impor um imposto substancial e imediato sobre a emissão de carbono, de tal forma a aumentar bruscamente o preço atual do carvão, e elevá-la gradualmente até mais que o dobro em 2030.

Talvez alguns até considerem essa política inadequada, mas é muito mais do que existe atualmente na agenda política. Portanto, na prática, Nordhaus e os ativistas climáticos mais agressivos estão do mesmo lado. […]

Então, o que ele diz neste livro? Primeiro, ele revisa a ciência climática básica. Ao queimar quantidades colossais de combustíveis fósseis, aumentamos enormemente a concentração de dióxido de carbono na atmosfera – e certamente a elevaremos muito mais nas próximas décadas. O problema é que o CO2 é um gás de efeito estufa (assim como muitos outros gases também liberados em consequência da industrialização): ele retém calor, elevando a temperatura do planeta.

De que nível de elevação estamos falando? Nordhaus segue o consenso científico do último relatório do Painel Intergovernamental da Mudança Climática (IPCC), que coloca o provável aumento entre 1,8 e 4 graus centígrados em 2100. Na verdade, Nordhaus aponta para o máximo deste intervalo, com a elevação da temperatura em até aproximadamente 6ºC em 2200. Ele observa também a possibilidade de haver surpresas desagradáveis. Por exemplo, se o aquecimento levar à liberação de quantidades substanciais de metano – um poderoso gás de efeito estufa – provenientes do descongelamento da tundra.

O aquecimento, por sua vez, tem várias consequências para além da simples elevação das temperaturas. O nível dos mares vai aumentar, tanto pela própria expansão da água quanto pelo derretimento do gelo. Aqui, também há a possibilidade de haver surpresas desagradáveis – por exemplo, o derretimento da camada de gelo da Groenlândia, que, por sua vez, causaria mais derretimento. Furacões ficarão mais intensos, pois são “alimentados” por águas mornas. Climas locais podem mudar drasticamente, com áreas úmidas tornando-se ainda mais úmidas ou tornando-se secas.

Há também uma importante consequência do aumento dos níveis de CO2, que não está diretamente relacionada ao aquecimento: os oceanos tornam-se mais ácidos, com efeitos adversos na vida marítima. Efeitos devastadores em recifes de coral já são provavelmente inevitáveis.

Quanto prejuízo isso provocará? Nordhaus desenha um contraste entre o que ele chama de “sistemas gerenciados” – como a agricultura e a saúde pública, atividades humanas basicamente afetadas pelo clima – e “sistemas não gerenciáveis”, tais como nível dos mares, acidificação dos oceanos e desaparecimento de espécies. Comparado a alguns autores, Nordhaus é relativamente otimista sobre o impacto da elevação das temperaturas nos sistemas gerenciados. Na verdade, ele resume estudos que sugerem um provável pequeno aumento das colheitas agrícolas graças a um ou dois graus de aquecimento, e declara: “É impressionante como este resumo das evidências científicas contrasta com a retórica popular.” Ele também vê os impactos na saúde como modestos, ao menos com o aquecimento provável neste século, com avaliação “similar à da agricultura”.

Os maiores custos, argumenta Nordhaus, vêm dos sistemas não gerenciáveis: elevação dos oceanos, furacões mais intensos, perda na diversidade de espécies, oceanos cada vez mais ácidos. O problema é como colocar um número nesses custos – o que ele precisa fazer, pois, como já apontei, seu objetivo é fazer uma análise da relação custo-benefício.

No fim, e apesar da desmistificação, Nordhaus conclui que haverá custos crescentes conforme a elevação da temperatura vá além dos 2°C – e um aumento de no mínimo tal grandeza parece, a esta altura, quase impossível de evitar. Quando se leva em conta o risco de aumentos surpreendentes na temperatura, surge um impulso incontrolável de agir para limitar a mudança climática. O problema, então, é qual o tamanho da ação e que forma ela deveria tomar.

3.

Existe uma facção no debate sobre o clima que reconhece a realidade do aquecimento global e seus custos, mas rejeita a noção de tentar limitar a emissão de gases causadores do efeito estufa – seja porque considera seus custos muito caros, ou (suspeita-se) porque limitar os impactos humanos no meio ambiente faz com que algumas pessoas imaginem que isso seja coisa de “hippie”. Assim, essa facção clama por uma geoengenharia: ao invés de limitar os impactos humanos, nós deveríamos compensá-los com outros impactos na direção contrária.

Muitos ambientalistas rejeitam a ideia da geoengenharia. Nordhaus não; ele sugere que esquemas como o bombeamento de aerosóis refletivos na alta atmosfera poderia livrar o aquecimento global dos gases de efeito estufa a um preço relativamente barato. Mesmo assim, como ele aponta, a geoengenharia não iria de fato reverter os efeitos dos gases, apenas servir para desencadear outros efeitos e isso, apenas em níveis globais. A acidificação do oceano, por exemplo, iria continuar; e mesmo se a média da temperatura global pudesse ser estabilizada, poderiam ocorrer enormes variações em climas e temperaturas locais.

No fim, Nordhaus faz uma bela análise de por que a geoengenharia deveria ser estudada e, consequentemente, guardada como carta na manga, da mesma maneira como médicos estudam e guardam em suas mentes tratamentos perigosos mas poderosos, a serem utilizados apenas, e só apenas, quando todo o resto falha. A primeira linha de defesa deveria ser um esforço para limitar o aquecimento global limitando as emissões de gases. Como isso pode ser feito?

No texto introdutório ao capítulo de Economia do livro, ele fala sobre o conceito de “externalidades negativas” – custos que as pessoas impõem aos outros através de ações, sem serem responsabilizadas por isso. Poluição e congestionamento no trânsito são dois exemplos clássicos – e emissão de gases é, em nível conceitual, apenas um tipo de poluição. É verdade, existem aspectos incomuns nesses gases: o mal que eles causam é global, não local; os prejuízos estendem-se para um futuro longínquo, ao invés de se manifestarem esporadicamente, e existe o risco de essas emissões causarem, além de prejuízos, uma catástrofe na civilização.

Contudo, apesar dos aspectos incomuns, muitas análises do livro deveriam ser aplicadas. E o que Nordhaus diz é que a melhor maneira de controlar a poluição é colocar um preço nas emissões, para que os indivíduos e empresas tenham um incentivo financeiro para reduzi-los. […]

Por que tributar o carbono é melhor do que regular diretamente as emissões? Todo economista conhece os argumentos: medidas para reduzir emissões podem acontecer em muitas “margens”, e nós deveríamos dar às pessoas incentivo para explorar essas margens. Deveriam os próprios consumidores tentar usar menos energia? Eles deveriam mudar seu consumo para produtos que usam menos energia ao ser fabricados? Deveríamos tentar produzir energia a partir de fontes com menores níveis de emissão (gás natural) ou sem emissão alguma (eólica)? Deveríamos tentar remover o dióxido de carbono (CO2) após o carbono ter sido queimado, ou seja, por captura e sequestro em complexos de energia? A resposta é: todas acima. E colocar um preço no carbono, na verdade, dá às pessoas um incentivo para realizar todas elas.

Por outro lado, seria muito difícil estabelecer regras para conseguir cumprir todas essas metas; na realidade, apenas conseguir comparar as emissões para fazer uma simples escolha, seja dirigir um carro ou voar até uma cidade distante, não é nada fácil. Por isso, estabelecer preços para carbono é o caminho a ser seguido. […]

4.

Gostei de The Climate Casino, e aprendi muito com ele. Mesmo assim, enquanto o lia, não pude deixar de me perguntar para quem, exatamente, o livro foi escrito. Ele adota um tratamento calmo e fundamentado, ordenando o que há de melhor em evidências econômicas e científicas em favor de uma abordagem pragmática da política. E este é o ponto: quase todo mundo que responde a esse tipo de argumento já é favorável a uma forte ação contra a mudança climática. O problema são os outros.

Claro que Nordhaus está ciente disso, mas creio que ele minimiza quão ruim está o cenário. […] O ponto é: há poderes reais por trás da oposição a qualquer tipo de ação climática – poderes que desvirtuam o debate, tanto negando a ciência climática quanto exagerando os custos para reduzir a poluição. E esse não é o tipo de poder que pode ser afastado com argumentos tranquilos e racionais.

Por que alguns indivíduos poderosos e grandes organizações se opõem tão fortemente à ação, diante de perigo tão claro e presente? Parte da resposta é pura e simplesmente interesse próprio. Enfrentar o aquecimento global envolveria eliminar o uso de carvão, exceto na medida em que o CO2 puder ser recapturado após o consumo; envolveria redução do consumo de combustíveis fósseis; e preços substancialmente mais altos para a eletricidade. Para alguns tipos de negócio, isso significaria bilhões de dólares perdidos, e para os donos desses negócios, subsidiar a negação climática tem sido um investimento altamente lucrativo.

Para além disso tudo está a ideologia. “Os mercados sozinhos não resolverão esse problema”, declara Nordhaus. “Não há ‘solução de livre mercado’ genuína para o aquecimento global.” Isso não é uma afirmação radical, é apenas economia básica. Contudo, é um anátema para os entusiastas do livre mercado. Se você gosta de se imaginar como personagem de um romance de Ayn Rand, e alguém diz a você que o mundo não é daquele jeito, que ele necessita intervenção do governo – não importa quão amigável ao mercado ele possa ser – sua resposta provavelmente será rejeitar a informação e se apegar a suas fantasias. E, é triste dizer, um bom número de pessoas influentes na vida pública norte-americana acredita estar atuando no Atlas Shrugged.

Finalmente, há um forte traço no conservadorismo norte-americano moderno que nega não só a ciência climática, mas também os métodos científicos em geral. Uma enquete sugere, por exemplo, que a grande maioria dos republicanos rejeita a teoria da evolução. Para pessoas com essa mentalidade, permanecer alheio ao consenso científico sobre a questão apenas sustenta e alimenta fantasias sobre conspirações malucas.

Daí minha preocupação com a utilidade de livros como The Climate Casino. Dado o estado atual da política norte-americana, a combinação de interesse próprio, ideologia e hostilidade à ciência constitui um enorme obstáculo à ação, e a argumentação racional provavelmente não ajudará. Enquanto isso, o tempo está se esgotando, à medida que a concentração de carbono continua a subir.

Ao longo deste livro, o tom de Nordhaus é um pouco cínico, mas basicamente calmo e otimista: o aquecimento global é, em última análise, um problema que deveríamos ser capazes de resolver. Só gostaria de poder compartilhar de sua aparente convicção de que essa possibilidade vai se traduzir em realidade. Ao contrário, continuo sendo assombrado por um dado que ele apresenta no início do livro, ao mostrar que temos vivido em uma era de estabilidade climática incomum – “os últimos 7.000 anos têm sido o período de clima mais estável em mais de 100 mil anos”, afirma. Como pontua Nordhaus, esta era de estabilidade coincide exatamente com a ascensão da civilização, e isso provavelmente não é uma coincidência.

Agora, este período de estabilidade está terminando – e foi a civilização que produziu isso, por meio da Revolução Industrial e da queima maciça de carvão e outros combustíveis fósseis. A industrialização, é claro, tornou-nos imensamente mais poderosos, e mais flexíveis também, mais capazes de nos adaptar a circunstâncias em transformação. A Revolução Científica que acompanhou a revolução na indústria também nos deu muito mais conhecimento sobre o mundo, inclusive a compreensão sobre o que estamos fazendo com o meio ambiente.

Mas parece que fizemos, sem saber, uma aposta tremendamente perigosa: a de que seremos capazes de usar o poder e conhecimento que adquirimos nos últimos séculos para enfrentar os riscos climáticos que desencadeamos no mesmo período. Vamos ganhar a aposta? O tempo dirá. Infelizmente, se a aposta não der certo, não teremos outra chance de jogar.

Notas

(1) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 3 (1973).

(2) Ver, por exemplo, William D. Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming (MIT Press, 2000).

(3) William D. Nordhaus, “A Review of the ‘Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change’,”Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 45, No. 3 (September 2007).

(4) Ver Martin L. Weitzman, “On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change,”The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 91, No. 1 (2009); e William D. Nordhaus, “The Economics of Tail Events with an Application to Climate Change”,Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2011).

http://outraspalavras.net/posts/krugman-a-civilizacao-no-cassino/

Naomi Klein: Green groups may be more damaging than climate change deniers The “No Logo” author explains how environmentalists may be more damaging to their cause than climate change deniers

Naomi Klein: Green groups may be more damaging than climate change deniers

The “No Logo” author explains how environmentalists may be more damaging to their cause than climate change deniers

TOPICS: EARTH ISLAND JOURNALNAOMI KLEINKYOTOUN CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISMNO LOGO,EDITOR’S PICKS

Naomi Klein: Green groups may be more damaging than climate change deniersNaomi Klein (Credit: Ed Kashi)
This originally appeared on Earth Island Journal.

Canadian author Naomi Klein is so well known for her blade-sharp commentary that it’s easy to forget that she is, above all, a first-rate reporter. I got a glimpse into her priorities as I was working on this interview. Klein told me she was worried that some of the things she had said would make it hard for her to land an interview with a president of the one of the Big Green groups (read below and you’ll see why). She was more interested in nabbing the story than being the story; her reporting trumped any opinion-making.

Such focus is a hallmark of Klein’s career. She doesn’t do much of the chattering class’s news cycle blathering. She works steadily, carefully, quietly. It can be surprising to remember that Klein’s immense global influence rests on a relatively small body of work; she has published three books, one of which is an anthology of magazine pieces.

Klein’s first book, No Logo, investigated how brand names manipulate public desires while exploiting the people who make their products. The book came out just weeks after the WTO protests in Seattle and became an international bestseller. Her next major book, The Shock Doctrine, argued that free-marketeers often use crises – natural or manufactured – to ram through deregulatory policies. With her newest, yet-to-be named book, Klein turns her attention to climate change. Scheduled for release in 2014, the book will also be made into a film by her husband and creative partner, Avi Lewis.

Klein’s books and articles have sought to articulate a counternarrative to the march of corporate globalization and government austerity. She believes climate change provides a new chance for creating such a counternarrative. “The book I am writing is arguing that our responses to climate change can rebuild the public sphere, can strengthen our communities, can have work with dignity.”

First, though, she has to finish the reporting. As she told me, speaking about the grass-roots response to climate chaos: “Right now it’s under the radar, but I’m following it quite closely.”

During your career you’ve written about the power of brand names, populist movements around the world, and free market fundamentalism. Why now a book and film on climate change?


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You know, The Shock Doctrine, my last book, ends with climate change. It ends with a vision of a dystopic future where you have weak infrastructure colliding with heavy weather, as we saw with Hurricane Katrina. And rather than working to prevent future disasters by having lower emissions, you have all these attempts to take advantage of that crisis. At the time, it seemed to me that climate change was potentially going to be the biggest disaster-capitalism free-for-all that we’ve seen yet. So it was quite a logical progression for me to go from writing about disaster-capitalism in The Shock Doctrine to writing about climate change. As I was writing The Shock Doctrine, I was covering the Iraq War and profiteering from the war, and I started to see these patterns repeat in the aftermath of natural disasters, like the Asian tsunami and then Hurricane Katrina. There are chapters in that book on both of those events. Then I came to the idea that climate change could be a kind of a “people’s shock,” an answer to the shock doctrine – not just another opportunity by the disaster capitalists to feed off of misery, but an opportunity for progressive forces to deepen democracy and really improve livelihoods around the world. Then I came across the idea of “climate debt” when I was doing a piece on reparations for Harper’s magazine. I had a meeting with Bolivia’s climate negotiator in Geneva – her name is Angélica Navarro – and she put the case to me that climate change could be an opportunity for a global Green Marshall Plan with the North paying climate debts in the form of huge green development project.

In the wake of Hurricane Sandy you wrote about the potential of a “people’s shock.” Do you see that it’s happening, a global grass-roots response to some of the extreme weather we’re experiencing?

I see a people’s shock happening broadly, where on lots of different fronts you have constituencies coming forward who have been fighting, for instance, for sustainable agriculture for many, many years, and now realize that it’s also a climate solution. You have a lot of reframing of issues – and not in an opportunistic way, just another layer of understanding. Here in Canada, the people who oppose the tar sands most forcefully are Indigenous people living downstream from the tar sands. They are not opposing it because of climate change – they are opposing it because it poisons their bodies. But the fact that it’s also ruining the planet adds another layer of urgency. And it’s that layering of climate change on top of other issues that holds a huge amount of potential.

In terms of Hurricane Sandy, I really do see some hopeful, grass-roots responses, particularly in the Rockaways, where people were very organized right from the beginning, where Occupy Sandy was very strong, where new networks emerged. The first phase is just recovery, and now as you have a corporate-driven reconstruction process descending, those organized communities are in a position to respond, to go to the meetings, to take on the real estate developers, to talk about another vision of public housing that is way better than what’s there right now. So yeah, it’s definitely happening. Right now it’s under the radar, but I’m following it quite closely.

In a piece you wrote for the Nation in November 2011 you suggested that when it comes to climate change, there’s a dual denialism at work – conservatives deny the science while some liberals deny the political implications of the science. Why do you think that some environmentalists are resistant to grappling with climate change’s implications for the market and for economics?

Well, I think there is a very deep denialism in the environmental movement among the Big Green groups. And to be very honest with you, I think it’s been more damaging than the right-wing denialism in terms of how much ground we’ve lost. Because it has steered us in directions that have yielded very poor results. I think if we look at the track record of Kyoto, of the UN Clean Development Mechanism, the European Union’s emissions trading scheme – we now have close to a decade that we can measure these schemes against, and it’s disastrous. Not only are emissions up, but you have no end of scams to point to, which gives fodder to the right. The right took on cap-and-trade by saying it’s going to bankrupt us, it’s handouts to corporations, and, by the way, it’s not going to work. And they were right on all counts. Not in the bankrupting part, but they were right that this was a massive corporate giveaway, and they were right that it wasn’t going to bring us anywhere near what scientists were saying we needed to do lower emissions. So I think it’s a really important question why the green groups have been so unwilling to follow science to its logical conclusions. I think the scientists Kevin Anderson and his colleague Alice Bows at the Tyndall Centre have been the most courageous on this because they don’t just take on the green groups, they take on their fellow scientists for the way in which neoliberal economic orthodoxy has infiltrated the scientific establishment. It’s really scary reading. Because they have been saying, for at least for a decade, that getting to the emissions reduction levels that we need to get to in the developed world is not compatible with economic growth.

What we know is that the environmental movement had a series of dazzling victories in the late ’60s and in the ’70s where the whole legal framework for responding to pollution and to protecting wildlife came into law. It was just victory after victory after victory. And these were what came to be called “command-and-control” pieces of legislation. It was “don’t do that.” That substance is banned or tightly regulated. It was a top-down regulatory approach. And then it came to screeching halt when Reagan was elected. And he essentially waged war on the environmental movement very openly. We started to see some of the language that is common among those deniers – to equate environmentalism with Communism and so on. As the Cold War dwindled, environmentalism became the next target, the next Communism. Now, the movement at that stage could have responded in one of the two ways. It could have fought back and defended the values it stood for at that point, and tried to resist the steamroller that was neoliberalism in its early days. Or it could have adapted itself to this new reality, and changed itself to fit the rise of corporatist government. And it did the latter. Very consciously if you read what [Environmental Defense Fund president] Fred Krupp was saying at the time.

It was go along or get along.

Exactly. We now understand it’s about corporate partnerships. It’s not, “sue the bastards;” it’s, “work through corporate partnerships with the bastards.” There is no enemy anymore.

More than that, it’s casting corporations as the solution, as the willing participants and part of this solution. That’s the model that has lasted to this day.

I go back to something even like the fight over NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement. The Big Green groups, with very few exceptions, lined up in favor of NAFTA, despite the fact that their memberships were revolting, and sold the deal very aggressively to the public. That’s the model that has been globalized through the World Trade Organization, and that is responsible in many ways for the levels of soaring emissions. We’ve globalized an utterly untenable economic model of hyperconsumerism. It’s now successfully spreading across the world, and it’s killing us.

It’s not that the green groups were spectators to this – they were partners in this. They were willing participants in this. It’s not every green group. It’s not Greenpeace, it’s not Friends of the Earth, it’s not, for the most part, the Sierra Club. It’s not 350.org, because it didn’t even exist yet. But I think it goes back to the elite roots of the movement, and the fact that when a lot of these conservation groups began there was kind of a noblesse oblige approach to conservation. It was about elites getting together and hiking and deciding to save nature. And then the elites changed. So if the environmental movement was going to decide to fight, they would have had to give up their elite status. And weren’t willing to give up their elite status. I think that’s a huge part of the reason why emissions are where they are.

At least in American culture, there is always this desire for the win-win scenario. But if we really want to get to, say, an 80 percent reduction in CO2 emissions, some people are going to lose. And I guess what you are saying is that it’s hard for the environmental leadership to look some of their partners in the eye and say, “You’re going to lose.”

Exactly. To pick on power. Their so-called win-win strategy has lost. That was the idea behind cap-and-trade. And it was a disastrously losing strategy. The green groups are not nearly as clever as they believe themselves to be. They got played on a spectacular scale. Many of their partners had one foot in US CAP [Climate Action Partnership] and the other in the US Chamber of Commerce. They were hedging their bets. And when it looked like they could get away with no legislation, they dumped US CAP completely.

The phrase win-win is interesting, because there are a lot of losers in the win-win strategy. A lot of people are sacrificed in the name of win-win. And in the US, we just keep it to the cap-and-trade fight and I know everyone is tired of fighting that fight. I do think there is a lot of evidence that we have not learned the key lessons of that failure.

And what do you think the key lessons are?

Well one of them is willingness to sacrifice – in the name of getting a win-win with big polluters who are part of that coalition – the communities that were living on the fence line. Communities, in Richmond, Calif., for instance, who would have been like, “We fight climate change and our kids won’t get as much asthma.” That win-win was broken because you get a deal that says, “OK you guys can keep polluting but you’re going to have to buy some offsets on the other side of the planet.” And the local win is gone, is sacrificed.

I’m in favor of win-win, you know. The book I am writing is arguing that our responses to climate change can rebuild the public sphere, can strengthen our communities, can have work with dignity. We can address the financial crisis and the ecological crisis at the same. I believe that. But I think it’s by building coalitions with people, not with corporations, that you are going to get those wins. And what I see is really a willingness to sacrifice the basic principles of solidarity, whether it is to that fence-line community in Richmond, Calif., or whether it’s with that Indigenous community in Brazil that, you know, is forced off their territory because their forest has just become a carbon sink or an offset and they no longer have access to the forest that allowed them to live sustainably because it’s policed. Because a conservation group has decided to trade it. So these sacrifices are made – there are a lot of losers in this model and there aren’t any wins I can see.

You were talking about the Clean Development Mechanism as a sort of disaster capitalism. Isn’t geoengineering the ultimate disaster capitalism?

I certainly think it’s the ultimate expression of a desire to avoid doing the hard work of reducing emissions, and I think that’s the appeal of it. I think we will see this trajectory the more and more climate change becomes impossible to deny. A lot of people will skip right to geoengineering. The appeal of geoengineering is that it doesn’t threaten our worldview. It leaves us in a dominant position. It says that there is an escape hatch. So all the stories that got us to this point, that flatter ourselves for our power, will just be scaled up.

[There is a] willingness to sacrifice large numbers of people in the way we respond to climate change – we are already showing a brutality in the face of climate change that I find really chilling. I don’t think we have the language to even describe [geoengineering], because we are with full knowledge deciding to allow cultures to die, to allow peoples to disappear. We have the ability to stop and we’re choosing not to. So I think the profound immorality and violence of that decision is not reflected in the language that we have. You see that we have these climate conventions where the African delegates are using words like “genocide,” and the European and North American delegates get very upset and defensive about this. The truth is that the UN definition of genocide is that it is the deliberate act to disappear and displace people. What the delegates representing the North are saying is that we are not doing this because we want you to disappear; we are doing this because we don’t care essentially. We don’t care if you disappear if we continue business-as-usual. That’s a side effect of collateral damage. Well, to the people that are actually facing the disappearance it doesn’t make a difference whether there is malice to it because it still could be prevented. And we’re choosing not to prevent it. I feel one of the crises that we’re facing is a crisis of language. We are not speaking about this with the language of urgency or mortality that the issue deserves.

You’ve said that progressives’ narratives are insufficient. What would be an alternative narrative to turn this situation around?

Well, I think the narrative that got us into this – that’s part of the reason why you have climate change denialism being such as powerful force in North America and in Australia – is really tied to the frontier mentality. It’s really tied to the idea of there always being more. We live on lands that were supposedly innocent, “discovered” lands where nature was so abundant. You could not imagine depletion ever. These are foundational myths.

And so I’ve taken a huge amount of hope from the emergence of the Idle No More movement, because of what I see as a tremendous generosity of spirit from Indigenous leadership right now to educate us in another narrative. I just did a panel with Idle No More and I was the only non-Native speaker at this event, and the other Native speakers were all saying we want to play this leadership role. It’s actually taken a long time to get to that point. There’s been so much abuse heaped upon these communities, and so much rightful anger at the people who stole their lands. This is the first time that I’ve seen this openness, open willingness that we have something to bring, we want to lead, we want to model another way which relates to the land. So that’s where I am getting a lot of hope right now.

The impacts of Idle No More are really not understood. My husband is making a documentary that goes with this book, and he’s directing it right now in Montana, and we’ve been doing a lot of filming on the northern Cheyenne reservation because there’s a huge, huge coal deposit that they’ve been debating for a lot of years – whether or not to dig out this coal. And it was really looking like they were going to dig it up. It goes against their prophecies, and it’s just very painful. Now there’s just this new generation of young people on that reserve who are determined to leave that coal in the ground, and are training themselves to do solar and wind, and they all talk about Idle No More. I think there’s something very powerful going on. In Canada it’s a very big deal. It’s very big deal in all of North America, because of the huge amount of untapped energy, fossil fuel energy, that is on Indigenous land. That goes for Arctic oil. It certainly goes for the tar sands. It goes for where they want to lay those pipelines. It goes for where the natural gas is. It goes for where the major coal deposits are in the US. I think in Canada we take Indigenous rights more seriously than in the US. I hope that will change.

It’s interesting because even as some of the Big Green groups have gotten enamored of the ideas of ecosystem services and natural capital, there’s this counter-narrative coming from the Global South and Indigenous communities. It’s almost like a dialectic.

That’s the counternarrative, and those are the alternative worldviews that are emerging at this moment. The other thing that is happening … I don’t know what to call it. It’s maybe a reformation movement, a grassroots rebellion. There’s something going on in the [environmental] movement in the US and Canada, and I think certainly in the UK. What I call the “astronaut’s eye worldview” – which has governed the Big Green environmental movement for so long – and by that I mean just looking down at Earth from above. I think it’s sort of time to let go of the icon of the globe, because it places us above it and I think it has allowed us to see nature in this really abstracted way and sort of move pieces, like pieces on a chessboard, and really loose touch with the Earth. You know, it’s like the planet instead of the Earth.

And I think where that really came to a head was over fracking. The head offices of the Sierra Club and the NRDC and the EDF all decided this was a “bridge fuel.” We’ve done the math and we’re going to come out in favor of this thing. And then they faced big pushbacks from their membership, most of all at the Sierra Club. And they all had to modify their position somewhat. It was the grassroots going, “Wait a minute, what kind of environmentalism is it that isn’t concerned about water, that isn’t concerned about industrialization of rural landscapes – what has environmentalism become?” And so we see this grassroots, place-based resistance in the movements against the Keystone XL pipeline and the Northern Gateway pipeline, the huge anti-fracking movement. And they are the ones winning victories, right?

I think the Big Green groups are becoming deeply irrelevant. Some get a lot of money from corporations and rich donors and foundations, but their whole model is in crisis.

I hate to end a downer like that.

I’m not sure that is a downer.

It might not be.

I should say I’m representing my own views. I see some big changes as well. I think the Sierra Club has gone through its own reformation. They are on the front line of these struggles now. I think a lot of these groups are having to listen to their members. And some of them will just refuse to change because they’re just too entrenched in the partnership model, they’ve got too many conflicts of interest at this stage. Those are the groups that are really going to suffer. And I think it’s OK. I think at this point, there’s a big push in Europe where 100 civil society groups are calling on the EU not to try to fix their failed carbon-trading system, but to actually drop it and start really talking about cutting emissions at home instead of doing this shell game. I think that’s the moment we’re in right now. We don’t have any more time to waste with these very clever, not working shell games.

Jason Mark is a writer-farmer with a deep background in environmental politics.  In addition to his work in the Earth Island Journal, his writings have appeared in the San Francisco ChronicleThe NationThe Progressive,Utne ReaderOrionGastronomicaGrist.org, Alternet.org, E magazine,and Yes!  He is a co-author of Building the Green Economy: Success Stories from the Grassroots and also co-author with Kevin Danaher ofInsurrection: Citizen Challenges to Corporate Power. When not writing and editing, he co-manages Alemany Farm, San Francisco’s largest food production site.

http://www.salon.com/2013/09/05/naomi_klein_big_green_groups_are_crippling_the_environmental_movement_partner/